Mwangi Maina
ON Saturday evening, Kenya’s political ambitions collided headfirst with the cold reality of continental diplomacy.
In a dramatic and bruising defeat, Raila Odinga lost to Djibouti’s Mahmoud Youssouf Ali in the high-stakes race for the African Union Commission (AUC) chairmanship.
This wasn’t just a diplomatic setback—it was a harsh reminder that the corridors of continental power do not operate like political rallies in Nairobi.
Kenya’s failure to learn from its 2017 loss, when Amina Mohamed was defeated by Chad’s Moussa Faki, returned to haunt it in Addis Ababa.
Djibouti delivered a textbook diplomatic coup, securing the coveted seat with strategic precision, leaving Kenya nursing its second bruising defeat at the African Union in recent memory.
Djibouti’s Diplomatic Masterclass
While Kenya stormed into the election with swagger and spectacle, Djibouti quietly played the long game. Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, the former foreign minister, secured a decisive victory with 33 votes in the seventh round of voting, methodically building support where it mattered most.
Djibouti may have only eight diplomatic missions across Africa—a modest footprint compared to Kenya’s which are about 20—but it compensated with relentless behind-the-scenes lobbying.
In contrast to Kenya’s noisy campaign, Djibouti’s candidate reportedly visited over 30 African countries in a low-profile but highly effective charm offensive. It worked.
By the seventh round, support for Odinga evaporated, and Djibouti’s quiet manoeuvring paid off. For Djibouti, this victory was more than just a diplomatic win—it was a long-awaited moment of revenge.
In June 2020, Kenya and Djibouti clashed in another high-profile race for the UN Security Council seat. Nairobi’s candidacy, which had the AU’s endorsement, was bitterly opposed by Djibouti, which saw it as an illegal bid.
Djibouti’s foreign minister at the time, none other than Mahmoud Youssouf Ali, accused Kenya of undermining regional unity.
Kenya ultimately won that race at the UN General Assembly, but Djibouti gave Nairobi a run for its money. The first round failed to deliver a two-thirds majority, forcing a second round where Kenya secured 129 votes to Djibouti’s 62.
This latest contest was Djibouti’s turn to turn the tables.
What Went Wrong for Kenya?
Sources within the African Union argue that Kenya’s campaign fell short of substance, focusing too heavily on domestic optics rather than serious continental diplomacy.
In an almost baffling display of diplomatic naïveté, Kenya sent 100 elected officials to Addis Ababa, to “cheer” Raila Odinga’s campaign.
The delegation jubilantly sang victory songs, turning the high-stakes election into a political carnival.
But as diplomatic veterans know, success in multilateral elections is not about noise—it’s about whispering into the right ears at the right time.
Kenya’s approach seemed overly theatrical, reducing a serious diplomatic contest into a noisy campaign.
“It was the brash transactional nature of the campaign that folks didn’t quite buy,” said a diplomatic source in Addis Ababa who witnessed the duel firsthand.
President Ruto’s transactional style may work well in domestic politics, but at the AU, it fell flat.
What defines Ruto’s foreign policy is his unabashed opportunism, often at the expense of long-term alliances and shared values.
His first major foreign policy move as president—cutting ties with the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) on Twitter—was a stark illustration of this approach. Kenya later reversed the decision, but the damage was done.
On Saturday, Ruto found himself standing next to SADR’s President Brahim Ghali for the AU family photo—the very leader whose diplomatic existence he had tried to erase on his first day in office.
A Diplomatic Coup for Djibouti
Djibouti’s success was not just about strategy; it was also about substance. While Kenya mocked Djibouti’s modest campaign, Mahmoud Youssouf Ali steadily built alliances.
By the time African leaders retreated for the final vote, the mood had already shifted. “The Kenyan campaign fell very short on values and substance,” noted a senior source at the AU.
“It felt too national, not continental.”
An East African minister, speaking on condition of anonymity, admitted to KFP that the writing was on the wall long before the vote.
“I saw it coming, my brother. I spoke to a few delegates and some old friends. I told my principal what my analysis was and what to expect. But as a matter of principle, my country remained resolute behind Kenya,” the minister said.
The reality of AU politics is simple: it thrives on quiet diplomacy, not media spectacle.
Raila Odinga’s campaign, while backed by Kenya’s formidable resources, lacked the subtlety and finesse that defines success at the AU.
Djibouti’s diplomatic coup is a stark reminder that in the world of continental diplomacy, it’s not the loudest voice that wins—it’s the one that whispers the right words in the right ears.
Kenya’s Takeaway
If there is one lesson for Kenya, it is this: continental diplomacy is a long game.
Theatrics and public endorsements may look impressive on the surface, but they rarely translate into votes.
Winning at the AU requires meticulous planning, strategic alliances, and a deep understanding of the complex dynamics at play.
It’s time for Nairobi to rethink its strategy and learn from its defeats. Continental politics is not a sprint; it’s a marathon—and one where quiet, calculated steps will always outpace noisy fanfare.
* This article was originally published in https://kenyanforeignpolicy.com/
** The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of IOL or Independent Media.